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Ann Okerson: Welcome back to the fourth session
of “The Long Arm of the Law.” Those of you who
have been here for previous sessions know that
our guest star has been Kenny Rogers; however,
he has been very busy with the Country Western
Awards in Nashville and could not join us today.
But, he has sent a substitute, namely, Bobby
Fuller. Now, this is no mean feat, because as some
of you know, Bobby Fuller died in mysterious
circumstances in 1966, I believe, and so to have
him with us with this group is really an amazing
kind of Charleston achievement that only Katina
could pull off. So they are going to sing “I Fought
the Law” to get us in the spirit of this session. This
is “I Fought the Law” in Latin.
I actually had a moment when I thought maybe
we could get Katina to get some of the Charleston
librarians dancing on the stage to this, but, well, I
was not sure how well that would go over.
Anyway, our speakers in succession are as follows,
and they are going to do their thing in order
needing no introduction beyond what you already
have in your program. First of all, Bill Hannay.
Whoops. Well, Bill decided not to come to
Charleston this year. He decided that instead he
would go to a hospital in Chicago and spend the
time there getting operated on. He sent this
image, and he sends you his greetings. But,
standing in for Bill, we have Bruce Strauch of
Charleston fame. He is a professor at the Citadel,
he is an attorney, and sometimes he even looks a
little bit like Bill Hannay, so I think he is a very
good stand in.
We then will move to Georgia Harper, who is the
Scholarly Communication Advisor at the
University Libraries of the University of Texas.
Copyright of this contribution remains in the name of the author(s).
http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284315241

Georgia and I met many years ago; she was an
attorney for Systemwide Copyright, for the Texas
system, and has done some marvelous work that
many of you know about.
Our final speaker is Madelyn Wessel, who is
Associate General Counsel at the University of
Virginia. I have heard that she has done wonderful
things to help the librarians with their various
concerns in digital projects.
So, that is our lineup for today, and without
further ado, let me introduce Bruce.
Bruce Strauch: I am married to Katina, and inter
alia, to the Charleston Conference. I have a
perfect attendance certificate to prove it. Some
years ago, she found this incredible attorney in
Chicago named Bill Hannay, who was a Yalie, and
a Supreme Court clerk, which just mystifies me,
that level of brain power. He commutes to work
by train, which I think is an indus of a big deal
attorney, to stand on a train platform with an
overcoat and a briefcase. He is an antitrust lawyer
and a tremendously talented guy. Then he tells us
he has to have a heart bypass, and I was
indignant. I said, “Bill this is not all about you.
What about us?” He was strangely unmoved by
the whole thing. He has come through it; it really
is a fairly finely tuned operation now. He is at the
dreadful phase where your ribs have been broken
open and now stuck back together, and you have
to blow into this tube with this little ball that goes
up to get bad stuff out of your lungs. Do it 50
times, you know, and start thinking fondly of a
death panel. I have his paper here, and it is not my
subject; I am not an antitrust lawyer, so I am going
to do this dreadful thing of reading it. Well, my
students think the most dreadful thing I could do
is to expect them to know something and ask
them questions, but this is sheer boredom. I will
try to make it through.
Plenary Sessions
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Legal E-Books and Illegal E-Books, Written By
William Hannay1
The general topic for my contribution to the “Long
Arm of the Law” program this year is the
continuation of two ongoing epic sagas in the
world of digital books: the Apple e-books pricefixing conspiracy and the Google Books copyright
litigation. Charleston Conference attendees will
perhaps remember my earlier accounts of
episodes in these sagas: “Of Books and
Competition” in 2010; “Apples and Books or A
Gaggle of Googles” in 2011; and “iPad Thai” in
2012. Since the last Charleston Conference, much
has happened in the Apple and Google cases. Let
us start with the trial and judgment in United
States v. Apple.

United States v. Apple, Inc.
As you may recall, in April 2012, the United States
Department of Justice filed a civil suit against
Apple and five of the six largest U.S. publishers
alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act
arising from an alleged conspiracy to fix the price
of e-books. On the same day, the DOJ announced
an already-negotiated settlement of the case
against Hachette, HarperCollins, and Simon and
Schuster. Not long thereafter, the attorneys
general of 33 states filed their own cases against
the defendants which were joined with the DOJ’s
suit for pretrial proceedings.
How did this happen? It all started with the
explosive success of Amazon’s Kindle e-reader. As
more and more publishers started offering ebooks in 2009, Amazon sought to dominate the
business with a low-price marketing strategy:
Amazon would retail all e-book bestsellers at
$9.99 for use on its Kindle e-reader (even if the
print version sold for a lot more). Publishers were
1

William Hannay is a partner in the Chicago-based
law firm, Schiff Hardin LLP, and an Adjunct Professor
at IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law. He is a frequent
speaker at the Charleston Conference and the
author of nine books on antitrust and trade
regulation. This paper has been previously
published: Hannay, W. (2014, April). Against the
Grain, 26(2), 56.
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not happy about this pricing point, and neither
was Apple which had plans to include an e-reader
program on its iPad (scheduled to be introduced
in 2010) but needed prices to be higher than
$9.99 in order to make a profit.
The publishers and Apple began meeting in
December 2009, and by January 2010, Apple had
executed individual “agency agreements” with
each of the publishers under which Apple would
act as an “agent” in selling e-books at a retail price
set by the publishers (which were $3 to $5 higher
than Amazon’s $9.99 retail price). In order to
make this pricing point work economically,
Amazon had to be pushed to raise its own prices.
The motivator for this change was a price parity
provision in the agency agreements called a MostFavored-Nation clause (MFN). The provision not
only protected Apple by guaranteeing it could
match the lowest retail price listed on any
competitor’s e-bookstore, but also imposed a
severe financial penalty upon the publishers if
they did not force Amazon and other retailers to
change their business models and cede control
over e-book pricing to the publishers.
When the government sued, the publishers
settled out, but Apple chose to go to trial. After a
3-week trial in June of this year, U.S. District Judge
Denise Cote—hearing the case as the fact finder
when the parties waived a jury—ruled that Apple
had, in fact, conspired to restrain trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
relevant state statutes. United States v. Apple,
Inc., Case 1:12-cv-02826-DLC, Dkt No. 326
(S.D.N.Y.), Opinion, filed July 10, 2013. Note that,
since this was a civil case, rather than a criminal
case, the correct terminology is that Apple was
“found liable,” not “convicted.”
The court found that the publishers and Apple had
“agreed to work together to eliminate retail price
competition in the e-book market and raise the
price of e-books above $9.99.” Opinion at 11.
According to the court, Apple was the lynchpin in
the conspiracy between and among Apple and the
publishers: “It provided the Publisher Defendants
with the vision, the format, the timetable, and the
coordination that they needed to raise e-book
prices.” Id.

Judge Court found that the MFN clause
“eliminated any risk that Apple would ever have
to compete on price when selling e-books, while
as a practical matter forcing the Publishers to
adopt the agency model across the board.”
Opinion at 48. The MFN clause “literally stiffened
the spines of the Publisher Defendants to ensure
that they would demand new terms from
Amazon.” Id. at 56. And during their negotiations
with Amazon, the publishers shared their progress
with one another. (The court’s written opinion
includes a chart of telephone calls between the
CEOs of the publishing houses.)
The court concluded that the conspiracy
significantly harmed consumers. Since “the laws
of supply and demand were not suspended for ebooks,” when the publishers increased the prices
of their e-books, they sold fewer books. Opinion
at 97. Thus, consumers suffered in a variety of
ways from this scheme to eliminate retail price
competition and to raise e-book prices: some
consumers had to pay more for e-books; others
bought a cheaper e-book rather than the one they
preferred to purchase; and still others deferred a
purchase altogether rather than pay the higher
price. Id. at 98.
Analyzing the trial record, Judge Cote found that
there was “compelling evidence” that Apple
“conspire[d] with the Publisher Defendants to
eliminate retail price competition and to raise ebook prices” and “overwhelming evidence that
the Publisher Defendants joined with each other
in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy.” Opinion at
113. Apple was “a knowing and active member of
that conspiracy…not only willingly join[ing] the
conspiracy, but also forcefully facilitat[ing] it.” Id.
In short, “[t]he totality of the evidence leads
inextricably to the finding that Apple chose to join
forces with the Publisher Defendants to raise ebook prices and equipped them with the means to
do so.” Opinion. at 134–35. Judge Cote even
quoted Apple founder Steve Jobs’s own words
against his company, pointing out that, on the day
of the launch of the iPad, Jobs told a reporter that
“Amazon’s $9.99 price for [a book newly offered

on iPad for $14.99] would be irrelevant because
soon all prices will ‘be the same.’” Id. at 149.2
The court subsequently had proceedings to
determine what remedy to impose on Apple. On
September 5, 2013, Judge Cote entered a Final
Judgment and injunction against Apple. The
court’s order requires Apple to modify its existing
agreements with the five major publishers with
which it conspired—Hachette Book Group (USA);
HarperCollins Publishers LLC; Holtzbrinck
Publishers LLC, which does business as Macmillan;
Penguin Group (USA), Inc.; and Simon and
Schuster, Inc.—to allow retail price competition
and to eliminate the most favored nation pricing
clauses that led to higher e-book prices. Apple is
also prohibited from serving as a conduit of
information among the publishers or from
retaliating against publishers for refusing to sell ebooks on agency terms. Apple is further
prohibited from entering into agreements with ebooks publishers that are likely to increase the
prices at which Apple’s competitor retailers may
sell that content.
Importantly, Judge Cote also granted the
government’s request to appoint an external
“monitor” to ensure that Apple’s internal antitrust
compliance policies will be sufficient to catch
future anticompetitive activities before they result
in harm to consumers. The monitor—whose salary
and expenses will be paid by Apple—will work
with an internal “antitrust compliance officer”
who will be hired by and report exclusively to the
outside directors comprising Apple’s audit
committee. (The Department of Justice had
initially requested that the monitor have broad
powers to block any agreements the company
might make to sell any digital content—not just ebooks, but also music, movies, and television
shows—that might, in the monitor’s view, be
likely to increase consumer prices; however,

2

For a fascinating collection of excerpts from Steve
Jobs’s e-mail introduced as evidence in the case, see
Zachary Seward, http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2013/05/the-steve-jobs-emailsthat-show-how-to-win-a-hard-nosed-negotiation/
276136/.
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Judge Cote granted power only over e-books to
the monitor.)
Two weeks ago, Judge Cote appointed Michael
Bromwich as the external monitor of Apple. The
60-year old Bromwich is an experienced criminal
prosecutor and investigator, sort of a “go to” guy
for difficult, high profile assignments. He helped
investigate the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103,
probed the FBI’s conduct in the Aldrich Ames spy
case, and took over the regulation of offshore
drilling after the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Earlier in his career, he was on the prosecution of
Col. Oliver North. To counterbalance Bromwich’s
lack of experience in antitrust matters, he will be
assisted by Bernard Nigro, the chair of the
antitrust department at the NY law firm, Fried
Frank.
Apple, Inc. continues to maintain its innocence
and has recently filed an appeal of Judge Cote’s
orders to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in New York City. The appeal will probably
take a year or more to work its way through the
system, but it is not likely that the district court’s
order will be overturned. The liability finding is
based on well-recognized principles of horizontal
conspiracy theory and reasonably grounded in the
evidence, and the remedy order seems carefully
and narrowly drawn to address Apple’s specific
type of misconduct, without overreaching into
other areas of Apple’s business (as the
government had wanted).
A more interesting question is whether the
enforcement action against Apple and the
publishers will meaningfully benefit either
consumers or libraries. For consumers, the prices
of bestsellers in e-book format appear to have
stabilized at levels lower than those prevailing
during the time of the conspiracy, but are about
15–20% higher than Amazon’s $9.99 price point in
2009. For example, John Grisham’s Sycamore Row
sells for $11.99, regardless of whether you order it
as a Nook Book, Kindle edition, or from the Apple
iBookstore.3 And there are potential damage
3

Changes in the marketplace itself may bring
procompetitive effects as well. For example, just a
week ago, Accenture announced that it has built and
will operate an end-to-end e-commerce and direct
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claims to be paid by Apple and the publishers: the
five publishers have already settled the states’
claims against them for $166 Million in damages.
Their settlement with the DOJ involved only
injunctive relief. Judge Cote has scheduled a trial
of Apple for May 2014 to determine the damages
that it will have to pay the states and private
plaintiffs as a result of its e-book price-fixing. The
amount of overcharges—which would be trebled
under the antitrust laws—could total hundreds of
millions of dollars in damages.
For libraries, the question of whether the Apple
case has been or will be of any benefit is more
complex. As some of the programs offered at this
year’s Charleston Conference illustrate, publishers
have made life difficult for libraries that wish to
make e-books available to patrons or researchers.
Some publishers refuse to publish a lendable ebook version of their titles, and those that do
offer a lendable one impose high license fees (you
cannot “buy” the book) and also various
restrictions on circulation. If you buy Sycamore
Row for your personal Nook or Kindle, it will cost
you $11.99, but if you want a lendable version for
the public library, you will probably pay eight
times that amount (assuming that Doubleday will
lease you one).
Why do publishers seem so determined to make it
hard for libraries to lend e-books? I bet it has
something to do with money, eh? Publishers
probably think they will “sell” more e-books to
individuals if folks cannot click on their local
library’s web site and download a copy of the
book for free. Is it legal for publishers to impose
high prices and burdensome lending rules on
libraries? Probably, unless it turns out that
publishers have been talking to each other about
their e-book marketing strategies for libraries in
the same way that they appear to have had
consultations about working with Apple on prices
to individuals. Personally, I do not know whether
to consumer distribution solution for HarperCollins
Publishers e-books globally. The project commenced
with the launch of HarperCollins’ www.CSLewis.com
and www.Narnia.com. See http://newsroom.
accenture.com/news/accenture-to-create-global-ebook-fulfillment-platform-for-harpercollins.htm.

any such conversations between publishers ever
took place regarding libraries, but it would
present a potential antitrust violation if they did.
Otherwise it becomes a matter of either
Congressional action (not likely) or jawboning
between publishers and their library customers
(more likely).4

Google Books
Turning to the long-running battle between
authors and Google over the Google Books
Project, the marathon has entered its eighth year
of combat. As Charleston Conference attendees
will recall from my prior reports, in 2005, a
number of authors and publishers brought a class
action and related litigation in Federal court in
New York City, charging Google with copyright
infringement arising from Google’s agreements
with several major research libraries to digitally
copy books and other writings in their collections.
(Since 2004, Google has reportedly scanned some
20 million books.) It has delivered digital copies to
the participating libraries, created an electronic
database of books, and made text available for
online searching. The Google Books Project and its
“digital library” has been hailed as a boon to
schools, scholars, and students, making all books
—especially out-of-print works—available to the
world.
The authors and publishers had a rather different
view of Google Books and sought both damages
and injunctive relief from the court. Google’s
principal defense was “fair use” under §107 of the
Copyright Act. The district court, however, has not
yet ruled on the fair use issue; instead, the case
has been sidetracked in two separate
(unsuccessful) settlement efforts and various
procedural disputes.
4

For example, in response to member concerns, the
Digital Content & Libraries Working Group of the
American Library Association has focused on
influencing the so-called “Big 6” trade publishers to
sell e-books to libraries on reasonable terms. See Ebook Business Models for Public Libraries (August
2012), http://www.americanlibrariesmagazine.org/
blog/ala-releases-%E2%80%9Ce-book-businessmodels-public-libraries%E2%80%9D.

Google and the parties suing it (particularly the
Authors Guild) tried to settle the case in 2008 and
again in 2010. However, after numerous
objections, extensive briefing, and lengthy oral
arguments, the District Court held that the
amended settlement agreement was not “fair,
adequate, and reasonable” and rejected it. See
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y., filed March 14, 2011).
In an effort to put the case back on track,
attorneys for the Authors Guild filed a motion for
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) on
December 12, 2011. After briefing and hearings,
Judge Chin granted the motion on May 31, 2012.
See 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Google
appealed. On May 8, 2013, the U.S Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit heard oral
argument and on July 1, 2013, issued an unusually
brief opinion reversing Judge Chin’s grant of class
certification on the ground that certification was
“premature” and should await further
proceedings on Google’s fair use defense. See
Google, Inc. v. Authors Guild, Inc., 721 F.3d 132
(2d Cir 2013). The Court of Appeals stated:
Putting aside the merits of Google’s claim
that plaintiffs are not representative of
the certified class—an argument which, in
our view, may carry some force—we
believe that the resolution of Google’s
fair use defense in the first instance will
necessarily inform and perhaps moot our
analysis of many class certification issues,
including those regarding the
commonality of plaintiffs’ injuries, the
typicality of their claims, and the
predominance of common questions of
law or fact. Moreover, we are persuaded
that holding the issue of class certification
in abeyance until Google’s fair use
defense has been resolved will not
prejudice the interests of either party
during the projected proceedings before
the District Court following remand. 721
F.3d at 134.
Thus, the question of whether it is “fair use” to
electronically copy millions of copyrighted works
has now resumed center stage in the Google
Books case.
Plenary Sessions
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Judge Chin wasted little time in moving forward
with consideration of the fair use defense. After
the parties submitted legal briefs, the court heard
oral argument on September 23, 2013. While it is
notoriously unreliable to divine which way the
case will come out from the give and take of oral
argument, at least one court watcher concluded
that the judge was definitely leaning towards
Google.5 Judge Chin appeared to find the decision
by his fellow judge Harold Baer in the HathiTrust
case to be controlling.
In that case, Judge Baer of the U.S. District Court
in New York City was faced with the obverse side
of the Google Books case. It involves the same
copying of millions of books by Google, but the
case looked at that conduct from the viewpoint of
the libraries that received from Google and, in
turn, made available the digitized books to their
patrons. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the libraries in October 2012.
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp.
2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court read Second
Circuit law to hold that, where the use of the
copied work is for scholarship and research, the
analysis “tilt[s] in the defendants’ favor.”
Moreover, the court viewed the copying as fair
use because it was “transformative.” Judge Baer
held that:
The use to which the works in the
[HathiTrust Digital Library] are put is
transformative because the copies serve
an entirely different purpose than the
original works: the purpose is superior
search capabilities rather than actual
access to copyrighted material. The
search capabilities of the HDL have
already given rise to new methods of
academic inquiry such as text mining. [Id.
at 460]
Judge Baer, therefore, dismissed the Authors
Guild’s complaint against the libraries.
5

See Albanese, A. (2013, September 24). Publishers
Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.publishers
weekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/copyright/article/
59222-after-quick-hearing-google-books-caseappears-ready-to-be-decided.html
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During oral argument in the Google case, Judge
Chin drew attention to Judge Baer’s conclusion
that the library copies in the HathiTrust case were
fair use and asked counsel for the Authors Guild
whether the court was not in fact bound by that
ruling. Judge Chin pointed to ways in which
Google Books has improved research and enabled
new kinds of research, such as data mining. (He
noted that his law clerks use Google Books to do
cite checks.) He asked whether these uses are not
“transformative.” Counsel for the Authors Guild
countered by focusing the court’s attention on
Google’s motivations, which were commercial,
not exploratory. He also pointed out that the
Authors Guild has appealed the HathiTrust
decision to the Second Circuit.
It is hard to predict whether the appellate court
will agree with Judge Baer’s admittedly
unprecedented application of the concept of
“transformation” in HathiTrust to permit copying
of the complete text of millions of books. Judge
Chin seemed to take a harder line when he
rejected the proposed Google Books settlement in
2011. At that time, he flatly declared: “Google
engaged in wholesale, blatant copying, without
first obtaining copyright permissions.” 770 F.
Supp. at 679. Now he seems to have changed his
tune.
It is hard to accept the proposition of Judge Baer
(and perhaps of Judge Chin) that the ease of
electronic searching of scanned documents is
legally “transformative.” Research for centuries
has been done by human beings reviewing the
text of books and documents, looking for words or
names or ideas. The fact that a computer can
perform that search process faster does not, it
seems to me, transform the process into
something so different as to allow an
unauthorized party to ignore the copyrights of the
original authors and publishers. Copying millions
of books and storing them in a searchable
database may indeed be a useful thing for the
world, but defending that copying on the ground
that it is for the public good strikes me as little
more than a “Robin Hood” defense, in which
stealing from “rich” authors is justified on the
ground that the proceed are being given to “poor”
academics. Is that really a “fair” use?

WMH
Georgia Harper: Well, I am going to talk about
transformative use. I am not going to talk about
Google, though, because that case has not really
been decided yet. But we have had a bunch of
really super cases this year that do go into why we
think things are transformative or how we can be
sure they are, and in academe that really matters
to us. This trend with transformative use started
in 1994 with a case that was a parody that Bill
might have enjoyed standing up here and singing
about. It was the “Oh Pretty Woman” case. I do
not know if you are familiar with it, but it was a
song by Roy Orbison that was parodied by a rap
group and turned into a song about an old hairy
woman, a prostitute walking down the street.
They did quite a number on old Roy’s song. The
Supreme Court did a number on the people who
sued, however, by saying that what the rap group
did was transformative. They did not elaborate
different types of transformative fair use, but the
court decisions since 1994 are a lot easier to
understand if we recognize that there are
different types.
Pam Samuelson described an approach that I
found really useful in an article from 2009 called
“Unbundling Fair Use.” It is important to
understand, first of all, that these transformative
uses are most likely to be fair use when they
support free speech first amendment values.
Second, one might create transformative works
and one might also have transformative purposes
in using another’s work. And third, the three
categories that Samuelson identifies within works
and purposes can overlap.
Transformative works are the easiest to recognize:
the parodies, the satires, the appropriation art.
These photos (referring to slide) show how Jeff
Koons adapted an advertisement for selling shoes
into a collage that he calls Niagara. The court
found that use to be transformative. When, as
here, the work is used as raw materials in
furtherance of distinct creative or communicative
objectives, the use is transformative.
Transformative purposes include productive uses
and/or orthogonal uses. HathiTrust, to whom
Bruce referred, is a good example. But first, let me

give you some ones that are more familiar
perhaps. These would be uses that promote
ongoing authorship. Research uses, including
making copies that will be used to inform or
critique or commentary, copies for new reporting,
quotes to illustrate a point, to demonstrate, to
explain. Another example might be making a
photograph of a sculpture for an analytical piece.
HathiTrust comes into the picture here with
transformative uses where its digital copies of
books are used to enable access by the blind and
visually impaired. Again, one might wonder, as
Bruce did, what is so transformative about making
books available for the blind? But that is what we
have these days, is a court decision that says it is.
It is up on appeal, we do not know how for sure it
will come out, and it is something to watch. It is
certainly something that a lot of people are
cheering.
Orthogonal uses are those wholly unrelated to the
use made or envisaged by the original author.
These are uses for a new audience, for a new
purpose, and HathiTrust is, again, instructive on
this point, the point that Bruce raised. Digitizing
works to index them for full text search and to
enable text mining are the examples we have
today. Now, again, these are strongest when they
support first amendment values.
Let me give you another example to illustrate the
differences among these categories. One might
critique or comment upon Margaret Mitchell’s
book Gone with the Wind by making a new
creative transformative work, another novel, like
The Wind Done Gone, or by writing a scholarly
article. Both might be fair uses, but one would rely
more on a transformative work creating a new
work; the other on a transformative purpose, a
productive use. One might also use her work for
an orthogonal purpose by including it in a text
mining project, perhaps to discover new
information about authors of her era or her genre,
which information itself might become the subject
of another study. My use of these images is also
orthogonal. I use them to provide a visual
reference for what many would say are rather
subtle nuances that define different aspects of
transformative fair use. As an instructor, I like to
rely on fair use of visual images to promote
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understanding of the law among those who want
to keep their activities within its sometimes
evanescent boundaries.
Now, keep in mind that even if a use or a purpose
is transformative, the user still must comply with
the rest of the requirements for fair use. She must
use only so much of the other’s work as she needs
to achieve her transformative work or purpose,
and the benefit of the use to the public must
exceed the harm to the copyright owner’s normal
expectation of commercial exploitation of his
work. With this framework in mind, let us look at
what happened in 2013. I chose three cases from
what was a rich array of results this year with very
interesting challenges. First, Ed Sullivan
challenged the Jersey Boys, Faulkner challenged
Midnight in Paris, and street artist Derrick Seltzer
challenged Green Day.
First, we will do Ed Sullivan. Sofa Entertainment is
the owner of the copyrights to the Ed Sullivan
Show. They sued Dodger Productions, the
producers of a play about the ‘60s rock band the
Four Seasons. Dodger used a 7 second clip of Ed
Sullivan introducing the band. In the view of the
Ninth Circuit, the use was for historical
significance. The court noted that the defendants
had imbued the clip with new meaning and had
done so without usurping whatever demand there
was for the original clip. The lower court awarded
Dodger attorney fees of $155,000 because it
viewed Sofa’s infringement claim as objectively
unreasonable and determined that awarding the
fees would deter future lawsuits that might chill
the creative endeavors of others. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed that award at the same time that it
affirmed the fair use defense. Now this
exemplifies a productive purpose. The Jersey Boys
uses a 7 second clip to show, to illustrate, to
demonstrate a point in the Boys’s historical
trajectory. Making it on the Ed Sullivan Show was
a major accomplishment. In fact, at the time, the
Four Seasons viewed it as their best hope for
reviving their popularity in the midst of the British
invasion. The clip also illustrates an orthogonal
use. The new audience, the different expressing
purpose, the recontextualizing: all of these give
the older content new meaning. The use of this
image serves as a visual reference for me to aid

92

Charleston Conference Proceedings 2013

you in understanding and retaining the
information that this case embodies, the
information I am trying to convey. These actors
and their director and producers are taking a risk,
and they are making a statement about their right
to reference the culture of the twentieth century,
our culture, for purposes other than the original
expressive purpose of the creator of the materials
and for a different audience, and that is what I am
trying to do as well.
Now, Faulkner. Has anyone seen this movie? In
Midnight in Paris, Owen Wilson’s character Gil
Pender at one point says, “The past is not dead.
Actually, it is not even past,” which he attributes
to Faulkner, even though it is slightly off, and he
goes on to recount a conversation he has just had
with the long-dead Faulker as proof of his
assertion. Now, this movie is a comedy. It is filled
with literary and artistic allusion. This particular
quote describes Pender’s problem. It is “Golden
Age” thinking, the erroneous notion that a
different time period is better than the one one is
living in. You know, it is a flaw in the romantic
imagination of those people who find it difficult to
cope with the present. This Golden Age thinking
pervades the film, both in its plot and its theme.
Faulker’s point was altogether different; it was
about the past catching up with you. This suggests
that the use was orthogonal. It is a productive use,
as well; in other words, Midnight’s director had a
transformative purpose. The quote is used to
illustrate a point about our attachment to the life
of the past. To explain, and this is, as you all know,
a rather traditional use of a quote, a short quote.
The Court elaborates on the orthogonal purpose,
however, but going on to say that the speaker,
time, place, and purpose of the quote in these
two works are diametrically dissimilar. The quote
even takes on an aspect of transformative use, in
the creative sense, in the Court’s view, and this is
where they quote back to the “Oh Pretty Woman”
case, Campbell. The use of these nine words in
Midnight undoubtedly adds something new with a
further purpose or different character altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.
So the quote has been entirely recontextualized,
and that itself is what is transformative.

Now the third case relies on a creative use, not
the purpose we have been talking about so far:
Selter v. Green Day. Photographer Richard Staub
had earlier taken a photograph of a wall that was
just plastered with Derrick Seltzer’s street art. And
when he was later hired by Green Day to create a
video for the group that would play during a live
performance, he built a set that included an image
that was inspired by Seltzer’s work. The video
actually filmed a series of artists coming onto the
set, adding art to the wall, and then exiting. The
film was the creation of the wall. Finally, the video
played as the backdrop for a single song in a
Green Day performance, and these three
photographs illustrate the process of that
transformation. Interestingly in this case, the
plaintiff actually helped the defendant make his
case. Seltzer complained about how much Green
Day had changed his work. How horribly they had
deformed it, and how they had changed its
meaning to be almost the opposite of what he had
intended. Well, of course, these qualities are
precisely what made it transformative and a fair
use, even though Green Day used the whole of his
image. Further, it was clear that Seltzer would
never have given permission for this, so Green
Day had no option but to rely on fair use. And
importantly, the use supports a free speech value,
and finally, the harm to Seltzer was, by his own
admission, minimal, and that he never would have
licensed the work, so the value to the public far
outweighed the harm to Seltzer.
Now, what does this mean for us in academe?
Well, of course, being from academe myself I see
very positive implications for scholars, but also for
their publishers, for artists, and their distributors,
for actors, poets, their directors, and their
producers, and, of course, for instructors. These
cases are very good news for all of us who are
involved in the creation, dissemination, and
discussion of works. They give us all room to
move, and this is what fair use is supposed to do.
As the court in the Jersey Boys case said, it was
quoting an earlier phrased decision, “An
overzealous monopolist can use his copyright to
stamp out the very creativity that the act seeks to
ignite. To avoid that perverse result, Congress
codified the doctrine of fair use.” So fair use
requires of us, as copyright owners, that we not

hold so tightly to our views about what we can or
should control. Copyright is porous on purpose.
The law gives us all these freedoms, and our
society is a lot better off when creators are not
afraid to take full advantage of them.
Madelyn Wessel: Good morning. I am here as a
practicing attorney at a fairly large research
university. Ann had emphasized the importance of
this session being at least a little provocative and
tackling issues of current relevance, so I thought I
would take us away from cases in the last portion
of the talk this morning and actually talk about
some hands-on issues with respect to online
ed[ucation], MOOCs, and some threads that I see
emerging in that space in my own work for my
institution and in talking with colleagues at others:
issues that really are not about copyright, but I
think are very important to librarians: issues like
privacy and issues around data use and data
rights.
I will spend about 5–10 minutes talking about
some of the intrinsic copyright issues and
concerns and IP ownership issues with respect to
Massively Open Online Courses, and then you will
see that we are going to move into some related
issues. When we are talking about MOOCs or
online materials, there are a number of big
overwhelming topics. One is, of course, course
production and copyright issues; some of you may
have attended Ann Okerson’s "hot issues"
preconference where Kevin Smith spoke about
copyright issues and MOOCs, which I am sure was
really wonderful. There are intellectual property
and ownership rights, as between faculty and
institutions, and this is a topic that is heating up
quite a bit right now. The AAUP, the faculty
organization, is putting out a call to arms around
academic freedom rights and ownership of faculty
course materials, which they see threatened by
the advent of university-sponsored agreements
for Massively Open Online courses. We have got
FERPA and ADA compliance, which I do want to
talk about today; we have got EULAs and privacy
policies inherent in participation in open online
courses; and we have got some issues that I will
close with today: just because a course is “free”
does not mean it’s actually free. What is
happening around data mining and data usage in
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this new space? And finally, the issues of
compelled transfer of IP, and when I say
compelled transfer, I mean compelled transfer for
our faculty and students when they engage with
cloud services around learning and teaching.
It goes without saying that course materials are
heterogeneous, and as someone who has staffed
my institution’s project with Coursera, this really
was brought home to me. My thought was, “Well,
we are going to have to get a release from that
talking head up front who is getting filmed for that
course.” When you start to really think about
what is involved in a course presentation,
especially one that is going to succeed online, you
are talking about a lot of other materials—all the
fun little gimmicks. By the way, this talk today has
been denuded of all the fun slides that I take off
the web like everyone else does to make people
wake up and to say hello, because unlike Georgia,
I am not making images the subject of this talk.
Like many, many faculty, when I give a talk in a
classroom or face-to-face that is not being
recorded, I use images to have fun. And faculty
are used to doing those kind of things in their
teaching; they are not used to thinking about
rights concerns at all in that process. But those
kinds of issues can become very live and vivid.
And then, of course, there are issues around
delivery of materials to students or participants in
these open courses. All of these are different
threads in the copyright equation. All of them
explode the safety of the traditional classroom
and face-to-face teaching, in which, as librarians
and others involved in the teaching and learning
enterprise know, we have a lot of liberty—that
liberty that comes from the copyright statute and
from the realities of fair use in the classroom. But
when you are interacting with a MOOC platform
provider, they are going to treat you as an
institution if you are an institutional participant.
The institution has to take the role of warranting
rights vis a vis a publisher.
We are now producing courses in an online
environment where all of the conventional
permissions and rights issues that publishers apply
to our faculty when they publish books, or a film
studio’s going to apply when its releasing a movie,
really come into play in some kind of way. Georgia
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and I were talking last night about how faculty
who create these courses are not thinking about
these issues. The enterprise of trying to work with
faculty for institutional delivery of a MOOC course
that may be, at least to some reasonable extent,
not totally illegal, has been really been challenging
for us.
Here are the traditional copyright exceptions
(referring to slide) that we love, that we use all
the time in institutions of higher education. They
are built to support a progressive and
opportunity-rich teaching and learning enterprise.
The issue is that, most of them, at least within the
structure of the Statute, are not written in terms
of Massively Open Online Courses that will be
generally available on the web. They are written in
terms of specific hierarchies and structure within
higher education itself. What we are finding is
that, in this space, fair use is again very important.
Fair use has a place within the copyright advisory
space for MOOCs, but what are the rules? And
these are questions that have not quite been
answered yet.
For example, what are the rules when it comes to
delivering these recorded course materials to
thousands of individuals worldwide? Does it
matter if the platform provider is explicitly for
profit? We all know that we have seen the
Supreme Court reject an analysis going back at
least as far as Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the
2Live Crew/Roy Orbison case that Georgia
mentioned; we know the fact that there may be a
profitable interest, motive, or result that does not
disallow fair use. That is an old argument that was
hurled at artists and others under the fair use test,
and the Supreme Court said that it can be a factor,
but if your use is truly transformative—even if you
are making money, you may still have a perfectly
valid fair use case. But how does that concept
apply in this particular environment, that is, if our
institutions (as we are all reading practically every
day in the Chronicle of Higher Education or the
New York Times), are really looking towards ways
to obtain revenue from these programs in the
long term. So how does that affect the fair use
analysis? Does our not-for-profit status help to
outweigh the for-profit status of a for-profit
platform provider? Does it matter if the content is

being beamed worldwide to countries that do not
have any fair use concept in their copyright
regime? These are lots and lots of issues, and as
one of my children said coming home from school
one day, “Mom, I am perplexed by the 157
questions for which God has no answers.” These
are on that list too.
Here are some pivots that I feel fairly strongly
about, and I think a lot of my colleagues within
the academy are advising on. Third-party content
that is integrated into, whether online courses,
videos, or content that is uploaded for broad
public access, is obviously going to work better if
it is transformative. Georgia has just described a
number of very recent cases where courts are
agreeing with that. It is always important to
remember the good, wonderful Ninth Circuit
cases around the use of technology being our
friend. Wherever it is possible to use content in a
way that is not rivalrous with perfectly legitimate
needs of content owners, that is a good way to go.
If you can use thumbnails or low resolution
images, that is great. Links that are going to
support a publisher’s opportunity when you are
using tiny bits of content can also be a helpful way
to at least make content owners our friends and
can potentially help with a fair use analysis. I
would say, though, that it is not viable to say I am
going to upload a whole lot of book chapters so
100,000 students worldwide can read chapters of
books. I think that is a licensing issue, and people
have got to tackle that one.
IP ownership, just for a minute or two: this is an
issue that I have found perplexing in its public
parlance or discussion recently because the reality
is that this all boils down to the Copyright Act and
institutional policy. For those of you in the room
who are at educational institutions, which I
suspect are quite a few people: institutional
policies around faculty ownership of intellectual
property almost invariably distinguish between
types of faculty output. Most institutions at this
point stipulate that faculty own their own
scholarly articles and books. So faculty can
produce scholarly articles and books that are the
products of their research, they can do it at least
in part on university time, they can sit in their
office laboring over that. We want them to do so;

it is part of the criteria of tenure and promotion,
and we give the authorial rights to faculty; we
either restore them based on how our policy
operates, or we never take them away in the first
place. We explicitly carve that out. This is then
where institutions diverge a little bit. Some
institutions, my own included, do assert an
ownership right at the institutional level to course
materials, even regular old course materials. That
does not mean that we would say to Professor X
who moves to another university, “You cannot
take your syllabus and your lecture notes with
you,” but we would at least assert a right to hold
onto that content at our own institution. In fact,
from a technical perspective, my policy says we
own those goods.
Other institutional IP policies tend to afford a
broader swath of rights. Some institutions say
faculty own all typical faculty outputs, whether
course materials, books, or articles. But all
institutions put up stop-gaps when it comes to the
creation of intellectual property artifacts that
employ significant university resources. Where
you are getting a ton of support and investment
from the university, the university asserts an
ownership right. This comes in part out of patent
law areas, where faculty and institutions need to
have strong and clear rights to be able to
disseminate IP in a patent licensing process and
get royalties back, both for the inventors and for
the institution. Distance and online education
courses almost invariably involve a ton of
investment. I have heard that the average Massive
Open Online Course right now is costing
institutions $100,000–200,000 per course to
produce; when you are talking about video
recording, addressing all the rights issues, support
from grad students and others, that is a very
significant institutional investment. Institutions,
under their universal policies around this, really
do own the IP rights, or at least have a claim to
them, and these may be shared with the faculty.
The concept that university participation in these
projects is robbing faculty of rights is one that I
remain puzzled by. You will be hearing more
about that; some of where that is coming from is
a perfectly understandable concern about
displacement. The issue around academic
prerogatives to choose and create courses, the
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concern about displacement of teaching
opportunities, those are realities. We are in a very
disruptive space right now in higher education.
Those concerns are clearly being brought to bear
around this issue. Regardless of how all this
settles out, platform providers need clarity in their
rights because when an institution signs up and
delivers a course to a MOOC platform, the
platform provider wants to know that the rights
are clear and okay.
Accessibility is a huge and growing issue, one
where the Department of Justice and the Office of
Civil Rights are really slamming us, probably for
some good reasons around accessibility of new
technologies and new content opportunities. We
all need to expect that any form of licensing,
whether we are securing content from a publisher
for journal access through libraries or whether we
are delivering content online, is going to be
subject to ever more rigorous accessibility
expectations under the ADA and under Section
504. Institutions that receive federal funds, that is,
all of us, absolutely have to think about these
issues. We are being used, quite frankly, by
advocacy groups to be the tail that wags the
content-producing and technology dogs. Under
the ADA, the Department of Justice cannot tell, let
us say, Google or Elsevier, “Thy content must be
accessible,” but they can tell institution X, Y, and Z
that if we license content that is not accessible,
we are out of compliance. There is an explicit
strategy to ensure that higher ed is fully aware of
our obligations and so that we push technology
providers and content creators to render the
content accessible and compliant. That is another
horizon issue I want to flag. It is coming up in the
context of MOOCs, but it goes far beyond MOOCs.
Now, let us downshift to a different gear. I am
going to move away from ADA to talk for a few
minutes about privacy and data use issues, and
then we can start a conversation. What is it that is
really happening, first, in the MOOC space? Well,
it has been pretty important to the for-profit
company Coursera in their terms of use (one of
those many, long, unread, 17-page documents
that we all click through and do not read
thoroughly), to say that “Hey, you are not our
student.” We talk about students taking online
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courses, but Coursera, for example, says you are
not our student and we are not subject to the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, FERPA,
which drives an awful lot of compliance efforts at
institutions of higher education. You are not our
student, and, because of that, institutions that are
working with an entity like Coursera (and there
are a lot of other companies out there) are also
wanting to be very careful because we do not
want to be in a position where it looks like we are
enabling a formal student relationship with the
institution that would give rise to rights and
responsibilities, not only under FERPA, but around
accreditation and all kinds of other compliance
environments, which would put the institution in
a very bad place with respect to its delivery of
content.
The paradigm is, we are giving you content, we
are not enrolling students at the institution. Here
is where things can get very interesting. Anyone
here currently at an institution where you have
created courses and uploaded them and where
your faculty are “flipping” the courses? Me too.
One of the things that I realized late in the game
was that we had faculty who had created great
courses, and they really wanted to flip the
classroom and experiment with that model, which
is an interesting thing, one of the important
drivers of this experiment with MOOCs. But they
were having students just enroll with Provider X in
order to take the course at the institution. That
brings FERPA right back into the picture. If the
students, in enrolling for that course, have got to
waive their FERPA rights and agree to have their
data commercially used, then actually I have
forced a student at my institution to waive their
privacy rights in order to take a course at my
institution. It is not just some participant, some
nonstudent out there in the universe who is
agreeing to that trade in exchange for free access
to education, it is my institution; it is something to
think about. You want to make sure that that is
not happening and that students have a legitimate
choice around privacy waivers.
The issues around privacy and compliance are, by
the way, going to be ever broader because the
European Union has an even more rigorous
structure around privacy than the United States

does, and I think we can expect open online
course providers to be grappling as we see
Google, for example, constantly getting sued in
European countries around privacy practices. This
stuff is going to be part of the online space as
well.
This leads me to a final couple of slides, and not
just about MOOC providers. The EULA, the online
license, the end user license that is getting thrown
in front of us every time our browsers touch the
web, is a really important thing for us to care
about. It is something important for librarians to
care about, increasingly. I know how ubiquitous
this is, and I know how hard it is. Every single
person in this room who signed up for Internet
access clicked right past a EULA. You do not know
what that said. You probably agreed to indemnify
some company, whoever the service is from, and
you probably agreed to be sued in whatever home
state jurisdiction they have. You might have
agreed to share data in ways that would not be
very appropriate from the perspective of your
institutions policies. You just do not know because
nobody reads them. I am here to say that when
we are employing cloud products, products that
involve a faculty or student’s browser touching a
web space, we must care about those issues. We
should care about them a lot because
fundamental issues of privacy, of IP ownership,
and of use and access to data are implicated
there. When you start to read EULAs, you find
some very tricky and unpleasant things. For
example, think about cloud products that are
being tested by faculty in the classroom to
measure learning analytics, which is one of those
hot new terms. If you read through the license,
you may realize that your faculty and students
have agreed that all of the IP that is created in
that course testing space has also been given
nonexclusively to the host and can be used and
reused by that company. And when the license
does not comply with FERPA in the first place, and
your students in taking your class have to agree to
these kinds of terms, that is an issue of concern,
at least to me. I think it is the kind of issue that is
also of concern to the libraries.
New copyright strategies of platform providers,
whether they are MOOCs or others, also bring us

back into this cycle. Platform providers are trying
to make deals with publishers and content owners
who are perfectly reasonable in their intentions,
but if you are an institution and you have
launched a course and the course is being linked
through content deals to publisher opportunities,
you are not a party to that agreement. If the
platform provider is giving away the farm around
privacy and IP ownership rights, and your faculty
are not reading this language, and your university
is not interpreting it, and not realizing that by
agreeing to utilize certain content or certain
textbooks as part of a course, anyone who enrolls
in the course is going to be dragged into a space—
again, that has privacy or IP ownership and data
rights implications. That is not good stewardship.
Cloud companies, in general, are seeing this space
as opportunity rich. Frankly, they are counting on
something that is true, which is that we cannot all
read these licenses. For example, when it comes
to institutional programs, I have two grown-up
kids, and I know that they have very little of this
sense of privacy that I might have as an older
person. They have thrown their lives up on
Facebook, and they Twitter, and they really do not
care very much about these issues. And that is
fine in the private and personal space of all of us.
But when it comes to the stewardship we have as
institutions and libraries towards our students and
faculty, we need to up the ante in our game.
Here is, for example, something that just struck
me in the last two weeks, in the middle of a
negotiation I am handling for many institutions in
my state: it is a very big deal for a content license.
All of sudden pops up a deal we have historically
renegotiated every 5 years or so. In reviewing the
renewal license, I realized that the hard won
compromise that our state’s libraries had around
usage statistics needed attention. The balance of
patron privacy, library needs, and publisher
legitimate needs had suddenly been tilted by a
new little clause in the license that said, first of all,
that all privacy was going to be safeguarded,
except as described in the license itself, which was
usage statistics based, or as described in the
online privacy policy. And what does the online
privacy policy say? Basically, the publisher can
change its policy whenever as desired, which is
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what we all know can happen with online policies.
I strongly objected to this. This is not a situation
where, frankly, we should have a EULA or an
online license. We have faculty and students
reading articles off this database. They are not
uploading to the database; they are simply
reading content that we are buying at enormous
expense. I do not think their privacy rights ought
to be breached when we are paying millions of
dollars a year to deliver content to them. You
need to watch out for these things, because if you
do not, you are basically setting up a dynamic
where the library-licensed resources have become
another tool to harvest data in ways that you may
not think are appropriate.
I am happy that we already got an introduction to
the wonderful Woody Allen, because I am ending
with Woody Allen here. “Just because you’re
paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get
you.” Lest you think I have jumped off the deep
end as a lawyer for my institution, know that
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many factors must be appropriately balanced. We
are living in a dynamic world of new technology,
data analytics are here to stay, and I am not
someone who is objecting to content owners
having opportunities to interact with institutions
around data sharing and analysis. That is going to
happen. The issue is whether it is happening in a
place where the fulcrum of ethics and of
stewardship is reasonable and where we are
paying attention enough to these issues to not,
frankly, get dragged right off the boat into the
deep end of the sea without knowing what is
happening. My admonition here is that we need
to be alert to these matters; we need to not check
our skepticism at the door. We do not want to be
so excited about winning these wonderful
copyright battles in federal courts, which has been
an increasing trend, that we lose our critical
judgment around other things that could be
happening that could be undermining some of
those victories at the very same moment. Thanks
so much.

